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Let Freedom Ring in Post-Olympics Beijing:  
Enforceability Strategies for China’s National Human 
Rights Action Plan Found in the Intersections between 
Asian History, Culture, and International Law 
Alissa N. Baier 
 
Chinese high school sophomore Chen Le stated forcefully, “I would 
rather be forced out of school, than deny my faith.”1 
On October 20, 2009, Chen’s school in China’s Xinjiang Province 
officially expelled him for signing a document confirming his identity as a 
Christian.2 The Official Notice of Expulsion3 reads as follows: 
Decision on Chen Le, Student of Our [Huashan Middle] 
School: 
Chen Le, a 2nd grader from Class 8 of Senior High School, was 
found by Bazhou Public Security Agency and other related 
agencies to have engaged in Christian gatherings. His school was 
notified that it should educate the student and persuade him to 
mend his ways. However, efforts from the class advisor and some 
leaders from the school in educating him have all failed and this 
student persists in his belief that he should not renounce his 
Christian belief. He can’t promise that he will not believe in 
Christianity or attend Christian activities. He also claims that if the 
school wants him to write a statement of self-criticism and self-
introspection of examining his error of attending religious 
activities as a high school student, he would rather not attend this 
school. Given the above situation, this school advises him to 
transfer to other related schools. 
High School Division 
Huashan Middle School 
2nd Agricultural Division of Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps 
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Chen Le says that he does not regret signing this document, but Chen’s 
expulsion subsequently bars him from taking China’s mandatory college 
entrance exam and will effectively deprive him of future education.4 
As a Christian student myself who has lived in China for an extended 
period of my life, I can relate to the reason why Chen made this incredibly 
controversial, life-altering decision—a decision he would not have faced if 
it weren’t for his country’s oppression political practices. However, I also 
recognize the universality of Chen’s situation, that even for those with no 
personal faith, no experience living in China, and seemingly nothing to lose; 
the lack of religious freedom is nonetheless problematic for its inextricable 
ties to freedom of speech, association, legal representation, and property, 
among other basic rights that all humans share, regardless of religious belief 
or lack thereof. 
Another iconic example of such religious and political oppression can be 
found in the experiences of Gao Zhisheng, a Christian human rights 
attorney who is presently missing, after being captured and imprisoned by 
the Chinese for more than two years.5 He was an unyielding advocate for 
constitutional reform and justice in Chinese courts, arguing landmark cases 
to defend property owners alongside political and religious dissenters, and 
he was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008 and 2010. As a 
result of having written an open letter to the US Congress, exposing the 
brutality of the Communist Party and their persecution of house church 
Christians, Gao was seized by a dozen police officers on February 4, 2009.6 
Fourteen months later, he reemerged and held interviews with the 
Associated Press and other news organizations which recanted stories of his 
brutal torture.7 However, two weeks later, Gao disappeared again, and his 
family and friends have not heard from him since.8 Chinese police agencies 
either declined to comment or insist that they do not know of Gao’s 
whereabouts.9 In their efforts to obtain his release, both ChinaAid and 
Voice of the Martyrs (VOM) continue to distribute a “Free Gao” petition 
worldwide, intending that signed copies will be given to the Chinese 
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Embassy in Washington, DC, the US State Department, as well as 
international organizations such as the United Nations and the European 
Union.10 
As frustrating and horrific as these stories might be, they are not 
surprising to those with any previous knowledge of China’s religious 
climate. Not just Protestant and Catholic Christians, but also Muslim 
minorities living in rural Xinjiang Province, Tibetan Buddhists, the Falun 
Gong, and other religious groups have experienced persecution under the 
Chinese Communist Party’s rule.11 The only surprise lies in the fact that, in 
2009, China put forth its own National Human Rights Action Plan, which 
includes five provisions specific to the protection of religious freedom.12 
Yet, persecution of individuals, churches, and organizations of all faiths are 
still occurring, and the international legal community is puzzled as to how 
to act in response.13 
However noble its efforts, Western-style diplomacy historically has not 
proven successful in changing China’s policies and procedures. Given the 
Communist country’s past failures to promote rule-of-law, and its current 
treatment of citizens like Chen Le and Gao Zhisheng, it is doubtful that 
traditional international law mechanisms such as petitions and treaties will 
open doors for Chinese religious freedom. Although China’s own Action 
Plan addresses these important issues, and its willingness to draft and 
publish it “deserves praise,”14 the Action Plan cannot be considered a 
blueprint for Chinese human rights reform or a reasonable tool for 
accountability. It has been more than two years now since the Action Plan’s 
release, and the Chinese government’s failures to adequately implement its 
key commitments regarding religious freedom, among other human rights, 
have “rendered it largely a series of unfulfilled promises.”15 
Regardless of past experience and present commentary, the Action Plan’s 
addition to China’s legal landscape still introduces an opportunity for 
increased religious freedom. In order for the Action Plan to gain its greatest 
impact, two parties must play particular roles. First, the United States and 
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the international community, as each seeks practical methods of 
enforceability, should keep in mind China’s unique cultural framework for 
viewing law and society, as well as China’s aversion to Western-style 
human rights impositions.16 Second, Chinese religious followers of all faiths 
should strive to prove themselves as beneficial citizens whose humanitarian 
work and core beliefs are essential to promoting the common good of their 
country. 
In this article, I look at the religious freedom provisions of China’s 
Action Plan and offer concrete solutions for enforceability, given China’s 
complex historical and cultural context. Part I provides a brief history of 
China’s religious climate, culminating with several key events from the past 
few years. From the 2008 Summer Olympic Games to the Sichuan 
earthquake to the many important political anniversaries of 2009, much has 
happened by the end of the last decade, making an up-to-date account of 
China’s human rights record and fresh legal analysis necessary in order to 
understand the potential effectiveness of the Action Plan. Part II includes a 
basic description of three primary cultural attitudes—rule-of-law versus 
rule-of-man, individual versus collective well-being, and legal versus 
relational contract formation—that provide a framework for Chinese legal 
thought. This is necessary to shed light on not only why China drafted its 
Action Plan but also to illuminate why enforceability of such a document 
will not come easily. 
Given the historical and cultural framework provided in the first half of 
this article, Part III discusses China’s prevailing law regarding religious 
human rights, including its national constitution, key international human 
rights treaties, as well as the new Action Plan. Part IV analyzes China’s 
successes and failures in implementing its international obligations and how 
the Action Plan will likely follow suit. Finally, Part V suggests 
methodologies, the best-equipped players, and a time frame for enforcing 
the Action Plan and holding China accountable on human rights as a whole, 
but more specifically, encouraging religious freedom.17 
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I. CHINA’S LONG STRUGGLE WITH RELIGION 
Before any American political leader, human rights lawyer, or even a 
legally knowledgeable layperson attempts to grapple with the religious 
provisions of China’s Action Plan, he or she should educate themselves on 
China’s evolution of attitudes towards religion, not only in the context of its 
current Communist government, but also considering the rich history that 
China has accumulated for thousands of years. 
A. Confucianist Roots 
Antireligious attitudes have a long tradition in China, dating back to the 
fourth century BC, when many intellectuals and politicians equated religion 
with superstition. Chinese legal scholar Thomas Heberer stated, “China’s 
supreme power has always endeavored to keep religious activity under 
control so as not to jeopardize the unity and stability of the state.”18 In fact, 
many of the same tactics used by ancient Chinese dynasties to repress 
religious believers—restricting the number of religions allowed within the 
country, prohibiting private construction of temples, punishing those who 
worship outside officially recognized channels, etc.—are still employed 
today by China’s Communist Party.19 
Confucianism and Daoism—the first spiritual movements to spread 
throughout dynastic China—were also political and philosophical in 
nature.20 Unlike Judeo-Christian religions of the Western world, Confucian 
philosophy emphasized earthly existence, the structure of society, and filial 
responsibilities while maintaining a bias against “superstition.”21 These 
values would continue to permeate Chinese culture and thought, influencing 
the way that outside religions were accepted or denied entrance into 
China.22 
China’s ruling elite was primarily composed of Confucianists who 
developed the “Ministry of Rites,” an intricate system of religious 
restrictions for maintaining political control.23 Several departments of this 
Ministry existed to impose a monopoly over all religious matters, efficiently 
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suppressing various religious denominations and the development of 
heretical movements.24 For example, laws during the Qing dynasty (1644–
1912) restricted the number of monks and nuns who could engage in 
religious activities, prohibited the private construction of temples, punished 
anyone with “eighty strokes of the stick [who made a] private appeal to 
Heaven” by worshipping outside officially recognized channels, and even 
called for decapitation of anyone who created or distributed heretical 
religious literature.25 These measures may seem drastic, but China’s 
present-day control mechanisms for organized religion are not far removed 
in their tactics. 
B. The Entrance of Foreign Religions 
As the first foreign faiths were introduced to China, many Chinese 
leaders feared that both religious domination and political imperialism 
would follow and compromise the existence of the Chinese state. As 
Buddhism (the first of many religions) was introduced in the first century 
by Indian merchants, government officials continued to enact restrictions on 
its religious practices for the purpose of state sovereignty.26 By the seventh 
century, Buddhists had arrived in Tibet, and by the ninth century, a majority 
of Tibetans had become followers of a new form of Tantric Buddhism.27  
Silk Road merchants also introduced Islam into China’s western-most 
region, Xinjiang Province, somewhere around the eighth century.28 The 
predominant minority group living in this province, the Uighurs, devoutly 
continue today in their Muslim faith despite its conflicts with Chinese 
Communism.29  
 Christianity, the largest religious group in China today, was first 
introduced by the Nestorian Church during the early Tang Dynasty (AD 618 
–AD 907). Meanwhile, Western political forces arrived at the same time. 
The Catholic Church followed in the fourteenth century, and the Jesuits put 
down permanent roots in the late sixteenth century.30 Because Western 
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imperialism and Christianity arrived in China within the same time frame, 
the two have been forever linked in iron-clad thought by the Chinese.31 
Following China’s loss in the Second Opium War of 1858, Christianity 
continued to be seen as an invading religion. Among many other 
concessions that followed China’s defeat, foreign missionaries were granted 
the right to share their faith in China under the Treaty of Tianjin.32 
Frustrations with foreign religion and economic influence exploded further 
in the Boxer Rebellion, between 1898 and 1900, in which the “Society of 
Righteous and Harmonious Fists” (known as the “Boxers” in English)33 
attacked mission compounds across Northern China, besieged foreign 
embassies in Beijing, and openly persecuted Christians across the country 
under the slogan “Support the Qing, destroy the foreign” (Fu Qing Mie 
Yang, 扶清灭洋).34 On September 7, 1901, the Qing dynasty was 
compelled to sign the “Boxer Protocol,” a peace agreement between China, 
the United States, and seven other European nations who had similar goals 
to colonize Asia. In addition to the payments of funds, the Protocol ordered 
the execution of high-ranking officials linked to the outbreak of violence 
against Christians or those found guilty for killing Westerners in China.35 
C. Religion in Post-Communist China 
The year 1949 brought Mao Zedong’s famous Communist revolution and 
marked a turning point for the entire country—not just politically and 
economically, but spiritually too—as the government further controlled 
religion for the purpose of eventually eliminating it.36 Historically, religion 
had been subordinated to the demands of a Confucian society and its power 
structure, but after 1949, religion also became subservient to the needs of 
the socialist state.37 Even more so than nationalism, religion is seen as a 
natural enemy to Marxism-Leninism, whose “doctrine of dialectic 
materialism is in direct opposition to all religious teachings.”38 However, 
Chinese leaders, both at the time of the revolution and today, have not 
advocated the immediate abolition of religious practice.39 Instead, the 
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Communist Party has taken a gradual approach, stressing that religion is an 
historical product, which will disappear only when socioeconomic 
conditions have “improved” to the extent that people no longer need it.40 
Religion is tolerated, but not encouraged; it is protected to the extent that it 
does not obstruct China’s progress along the socialist road.41 
For example, an internal party document stated the Communist Party’s 
strategy regarding religion: 
The basic starting point and firm foundation for our handling of the 
religious question . . . lies in our desire to unite the mass of 
believers and non-believers and enable them to center all their will 
and strength on the common goal of building a modernized, 
powerful socialist state.42 
Given these elements of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the emergence of a 
Communist state in 1949 created alarming administrative barriers to the 
Chinese peoples’ expression of faith. As the party’s Central Committee 
formulated its policy towards religion, a Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) 
was implemented to oversee eight “National Associations,” each of which 
maintained control over a specific religious denomination.43 One 
government document states that the National Associations “serve as a 
bridge by which the Party and government unite with and educate religious 
personages.”44 Yet, control is the bigger issue—“[a]ll patriotic religious 
organizations must accept the leadership of the Party.”45 
Following the 1949 Revolution, Mao forced Protestant and Anglican 
Christians to dissolve their denominations in order to join their official 
Association.46 Specific to Protestant denominations, the Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement (TSPM) became the RAB’s main tool for “directing the 
concerns” of Christians (or more honestly put by Reverend Lin Xiangao, a 
Baptist Minister who spent more than twenty years in prison for his beliefs, 
the TSPM is “a tool used by the Government to destroy Christianity”).47 
The new three “self” Chinese churches stood for “Self-Supporting,” “Self-
Governing,” and “Self-Propagating,” which recognizes the autonomy of 
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Chinese Christianity aside from any foreign influence, including former 
“imperialist” connections.48 According to the TSPM, the church’s primary 
goal should be to submit to the Communist Party, not a higher spiritual 
being.49 This is particularly problematic for monotheistic, Judeo-Christian 
churches, as they are forced to recognize two heads—both God and the 
Communist Party. 
Aside from this issue of control over church leadership is also that of 
controlling the church’s teaching and doctrine. Under the TSPM, all 
religious messages must be made compatible with socialism.50 For example, 
TSPM pastors are discouraged from preaching on Jesus’ divinity, miracles, 
or His resurrection because such issues are seen as a threat to China’s grasp 
of power over its citizens.51 In addition to the TSPM’s control of leadership 
and doctrine, the TSPM decides which buildings can be used for church 
services, which pastors can preach, and what areas can be traveled to for 
purposes of evangelism.52 Although it varies from church to church, pastors 
are often required to self-censor their sermons in order to keep in line with 
the government’s ideas of patriotism.53 Church activities are restricted to 
Sunday services, with no midweek meetings, Bible studies, or gatherings in 
private homes.54 No minors under the age of eighteen may be evangelized 
or baptized.55 Surveillance is ordered for all religious leaders, and detailed 
records are kept on specific individuals and churches.56 Those who refused 
to register with the RAB or submit to its requirements were publicly 
accused and imprisoned.57 
China’s religious climate grew worse during the Cultural Revolution of 
1966–1976, when all religious groups were banned and even the TSPM 
vanished.58 Alongside intellectuals, teachers, and those of skilled 
professions, the nation’s clergy and church members were executed or sent 
to labor camps, or “swept away” as “ghosts and monsters.”59 But in 1977, 
China’s policies became more pragmatic under the leadership of Deng 
Xiaoping, and Christians were released from prison as a demonstration to 
the Western world of China’s new policies regarding religious freedom and 
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human rights issues.60 In the 1980s, the government allocated 140 million 
yuan (over $20 million) to restore religious facilities destroyed during the 
Cultural Revolution, and established forty-six religious schools.61 The 
TSPM returned to power in 1980 under the leadership of Ding Guangxun, a 
Nanjing Bishop and former Anglican, who must still report all affairs to the 
government.62 
Despite China’s historical and political biases against spiritual faith, 
religion as a whole is currently flourishing in China and in need of more 
protection. Chinese Christians are among one of the fastest growing 
religious groups in the world, likely because those who were once 
immersed in the political fervor of Mao’s revolution are now searching for 
something deeper to trust in.63 
As a reaction to the party’s restrictions, perhaps viewed by some as a 
rebellion or even a revolution, a huge network of unregistered churches has 
sprung up in secrecy over the last several decades.64 Known to the outside 
world as “house churches” or the “underground church,” these Christians 
have one main reason for refusing to register with the RAB: they recognize 
only one head of the Church, Jesus Christ. The TSPM estimates that China 
currently has sixteen million Protestants and three million Catholics.65 But 
in 2006, Ye Xiaowen, Director of China’s State Administration for 
Religious Affairs (SARA), claimed that, “these numbers of illegal 
worshippers comprise only 80 percent of all Chinese Christians.”66 Behind 
closed doors, the total number, including house church Christians, is closer 
to 50–100 million, as many are “meeting in private homes, caves, and fields 
illegally, defying the ban on unregistered churches.”67 
D. Religion in Twenty-First Century China 
Although Chinese religious believers may enjoy more religious freedom 
today in the twenty-first century than during the Boxer Rebellion or the 
Cultural Revolution, the Communist government remains in strict control 
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over all religious activity, making the Action Plan’s religious provision 
unprecedented in its intention to promote more freedom. 
Particularly in this past decade, as China continued to rise in its global 
involvement, the international community has put more pressure on the 
party to loosen its grasp on religion and improve its human rights record as 
a whole.68 Foreign nations have constantly criticized China’s policies and 
demanded change as a prerequisite to China’s global leadership in two 
particular events: Beijing’s acceptance by the Olympic Committee to host 
the 2008 Summer Games, and the celebration of several important political 
anniversaries in the year 2009, including the Tiananmen Square massacre of 
1989.69 Both events illuminate current international views of China’s 
religious rights situation, and they serve as building blocks upon which the 
country’s current Action Plan was erected. 
1. Beijing’s Bid to Host the 2008 Olympic Games 
When China won its bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games, part of the 
bargain included promotion of rights for Chinese citizens,70 identical to 
many of those that now appear in the Action Plan. The Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games issued its own “Beijing Action Plan,” 
which laid out these principles and promises.71 In 2003, Human Rights in 
China (HRIC), a nongovernmental organization (NGO) whose mission it is 
to advance the institutional protection of human rights in China, launched a 
special campaign entitled “Incorporating Responsibility 2008” to promote 
compliance with Beijing’s international human rights promises before and 
after the Olympics.72 In 2005, the HRIC issued an initial assessment report 
titled, Promises, Promises, detailing improvements that had been made in 
the first two years and what remained to be accomplished before 2008.73 
Although many of the reforms that the HRIC emphasized were 
environmental, freedom of religious expression was also a priority within 
the campaign.74  
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Particularly suspect among Beijing’s promises was its vow to guarantee 
security during the Games, which HRIC campaign leaders feared could lead 
to the abuse of security systems during and after the Olympic Games to 
track those labeled as “dissidents” and often includes religious believers. 
“Armed with new security technology acquired for the Olympics, China 
will have an even greater capacity to monitor and restrict individual rights 
beyond 2008.”75 The Olympics organizing committee spent approximately 
$300 million on security, and after 2008, China’s budget was expected to 
grow at an annual rate of at least 20 percent.76 
As feared, religious persecution only increased throughout the Olympic 
Games.77 It has become a common pattern that whenever the Chinese 
government holds an important international event, serious suppression is 
implemented to maintain the appearance of stability. The nonprofit 
organization ChinaAid Association predicted in its 2007 Persecution Report 
that the Chinese government in 2008 would “fool the domestic and the 
international communities with more skill, diplomatic means, and public 
opinion, while continuing its religious and political persecution and 
persecution of human rights so that they can create an image that they have 
made progress in the human rights condition in China.”78 It also predicted 
that the government would continue cracking down more on the religious, 
political, economic, and international political forces that challenge the 
party’s ideology and rule.79 Only in this manner can they best “purify and 
consolidate the Han chauvinist ideology integrated from ‘Communist 
politics and Confucian ethics,’ based on atheism and nationalism.”80 
ChinaAid’s 2008 Persecution Report showed an increase in religious 
persecution cases, finding that 2,027 Chinese people were persecuted that 
year, up from 788 persons in 2007.81 The total number of people arrested 
was 764; thirty-five people were sentenced to imprisonment, and sixty 
people were abused—up 71.4 percent from 2007.82 
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2. Political Anniversaries of 2009 
China put forth its Action Plan in the spring of 2009, following several 
key political events, including Beijing’s Summer Olympic Games, the 
worldwide reaction to Gao Zhisheng’s disappearance, and before the 
upcoming United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) periodic 
review of China.83 There is no doubt that it was a strategic move. Several 
important anniversaries in China’s political history would occur in 2009, 
each of which ironically presented even more opportunity for stability-
seeking through religious oppression, and the UNHRC would be taking 
notice.84 Keeping these anniversaries in mind, ChinaAid’s Annual 
Persecution Report for 2009 opened with the following statement: 
The Chinese government and the whole world watched events in 
China unfold throughout the year 2009 with anxiety. For 2009 was 
the year of the People’s Republic of China’s 60th anniversary and 
an opportunity to show the world her national influence and 
military power, as seen in the celebration in Tiananmen Square. 
The event divided the Chinese into two psychological camps: those 
who are nationalists, who celebrated with pride and excitement, 
and those longing for democracy, with much disappointment. The 
year 2009 gave no sign from the government that human rights 
would improve in China, and the society continues to be pervaded 
by corruption.85 
Beginning June 4, 2009—the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre86—and leading up to October 1, 2009, the sixty-year 
anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, plenty of extra precautions 
were taken to “safeguard the people” and give an appearance of control and 
stability before the international community. Several churches considered to 
be “dangerous” were shut down before both anniversaries, but on a more 
visible level, Beijing was transformed into a locality of heightened security 
and censorship.87 
Having lived in the capital city myself at this time of year, I traveled 
down to the Square just before sunset to see things with my own eyes. All 
1012   SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
those who wished to enter the Square were met with airport-like X-ray 
machines and metal detectors at the subway station exit. I knew that 
journalists were being turned away, but I had no idea that the personal 
journal in my purse would appear suspicious. Very little had been written 
between its brown, recycled-paper pages, and the cover was decorated with 
vintage Maoist propaganda, but I was still asked to show my passport and 
visa. (Apparently anyone carrying a notebook or recording device was not 
allowed to enter unless they could prove that their purpose did not include 
international reporting.) After analyzing my tourist visa and temporary 
student card to Beijing University, an official reluctantly released me into 
the Square. 
At first glance, one would assume only that the typical number of green-
shirted guards were present in Tiananmen Square. However, my American 
friend who accompanied me pointed out several young men in their 
twenties who were meandering alone, grasping a single bottle of water 
behind their backs as they stayed a standard six feet away from their street-
clothed-clones. It did not become completely evident to me that these were 
“plainclothes guards” dotting the Square until I saw a few give away their 
identities by marching with their officially dressed peers. 
Most civilians were gathered in front of the flagpole, directly across the 
street from the Forbidden City’s entrance, where they waited until sunset 
for the nightly flag-lowering ceremony. Entire families—from babies and 
school-age children to their mothers, fathers, and elderly grandparents—sat 
on the stone-tiled ground, camped out with their strollers and blankets, 
while the sky turned shades of orange and purple. As I observed their 
commonplace behavior, I wondered if they had any idea what today was. 
Did they know what happened twenty years ago? Did “June 4” ring in their 
minds as it did for the rest of the world? Did they even realize that swarms 
of guards were present behind them for a very specific reason? 
Even if they did not know, every foreigner in Beijing did, and very few 
risked coming to the Square that day. In fact, everyone I knew advised me 
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against it. My friend and I bumped into only one other non-Chinese couple 
during our ninety-minute stroll. 
Now years after the last Olympic torch was extinguished, the world still 
wonders when, or even if, a satisfactory level of human rights will ever be 
achieved in China. If China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the Olympic Games, and the recent political anniversaries were not 
enough to bring more concrete measures of religious freedom, then what 
will? Specific pressures must be applied on the Chinese government in 
order for change to come about, and as unclear as those pressures and 
changes might be (or who exactly should bring them), the Action Plan 
presents an opportunity for the world to do it. 
II. THE CHINESE STANCE ON RULE-OF-LAW, COMMUNITY, AND 
CONTRACTS 
Before a correct recognition and possible enforcement of the Action Plan 
can occur, the international community must realize that its attempts at 
diplomatic negotiations for religious freedom are wrought with cultural 
misunderstanding. For those of us Americans who were born in a nation 
founded on freedom of religion—a place where people still fight at all costs 
to “let freedom ring” and where personal rights are protected with 
fierceness—it is difficult for us to conceptualize China’s lack of religiosity 
and strict regulation. The country’s fierce relationship between government 
and religion is evident not only from its extensive history (as described in 
the above section) but also evident in the context of China’s long-standing 
cultural ideas. Before any Chinese law can be analyzed and evaluated for its 
enforceability, three particular cultural concepts—rule-of-law versus rule-
of-man, individual versus collective well-being, and legal versus relational 
contract formation—must be recognized. These cultural attitudes reveal 
several key differences between what an American and a Chinese legal 
scholar would recommend regarding the Action Plan. 
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A. Rule-of-Law Versus Rule-of-Man 
First, China’s rule-of-man philosophy has generally clashed against the 
ideals of the rule-of-law, both in regards to religion and other human rights, 
because the plain language of such written human rights agreements does 
not hold the same significance in China as a leader’s individual authority. 
Beginning from my own American culture and legal system as a familiar 
launching point, it is well known that the United States upholds a rule-of-
law system, as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Madison v. 
Marbury.88 “The President of the United States is . . . with certain important 
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,” 
but regardless, is “the officer of the law,” and “amenable to the laws for his 
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of 
others.”89 Rule-of-law requires that publicly promulgated laws be laid down 
in advance, that fair enforcement procedures be made available, and that 
law is supreme over officials as well as ordinary citizens. A “shared vision 
of justice” comes from the belief that “law should be the principal 
organizing framework of government and society.”90 
On the contrary, law’s role in Chinese affairs has traditionally been 
regarded with overt hostility. China finds more value in a rule-of-man, 
which allows political exceptions to the general rules for the sake of “saving 
face.”91 Whereas the Western world has traditionally equated law with 
moral authority, “mandates from heaven,” and deistic origin; the Chinese 
people associate law with despotic imperial rulers who manipulated it to 
impose arbitrary commands, duties, and punishments on the population.92 
Ancient Chinese law had everything to do with rulers’ discretionary 
benefits and little to do with providing benefits to citizens in their private 
spheres of life. Thus, the rule-of-law never obtained legitimacy in China 
because it was seen as the “perfect fly”—an infallible but irresponsible 
bureaucracy that could not be trusted.93 The rule-of-man, however, is 
illustrated as the “imperfect soldier”—fallible at times, but a strong and 
responsible administrator.94 Even today, official law in China operates in a 
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vertical direction, “from the state upon the individual,” rather than on a 
horizontal plane, like most democracies, which operate “directly between 
two individuals” with rule-of-law as their guiding light.95 
Other values, such as the primacy of relationships and the avoidance of 
conflict (which the Chinese believe to be far superior and more personal 
compared to cold, hard law), traditionally governed the arrangement and 
performance of public and private affairs.96 For example, the concept of 
“saving face” has been argued to uphold Chinese rule-of-man instead of 
completely converting to rule-of-law.97 To “save face” in Asian culture is to 
be concerned with one’s personal appearance and reputation, as well as that 
of one’s neighbors and elders.98 Emphasis is given to courtesy, respect, and 
following the rules so as not to cause embarrassment upon anyone else.99 
Under considerations of “face,” a double layer of negotiation occurs. The 
law is treated in both a public and a private manner, and concern is given to 
how legal decisions will make both parties feel internally, as well as appear 
externally to society.100 
Applying this “rule-of-law versus rule-of-man” dichotomy to a religious 
freedom example, Ye Xiaowen of SARA describes how China’s intentions 
to expand control over religion through legal instruments are, in actuality, 
an expansion of man-made discretion, giving that power to bureaucracy 
instead of the people: “Regulating religious affairs according to law means 
that the government administers and oversees the enforcement of the laws, 
regulations and policies concerning religion . . . . The purpose of managing 
religious affairs by law is to safeguard legitimate religion, curb illegal cults, 
resist infiltration, and crack down on crime.”101 According to Magda 
Hornemann of Forum 18 News Service, “Put simply, this represents not the 
‘rule of law’ but the continuation of ‘rule of man’—or, even more 
appropriately, the ‘rule of the Communist Party’—but through legal 
means.”102 At least for now, the Communist state “continues to treat laws 
and regulations as instruments to further its rule of man,” and subsequently, 
its control over religion.103 
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In this way, the Chinese prefer face-saving “rule-of-man politics” for its 
tolerance, affection, and relational aspects. Rule-of-man gives more leeway 
for people to “live and let live” than “heartless” rule-of-law governance.104 
Non-Chinese who adhere to rule-of-law politics deem face-saving 
mechanisms as too malleable and capable of breeding the same corruption 
that made the Chinese suspicious of law in the first place.105 Yet, no matter 
the standards used by the outside world to grade China’s government, 
within China, the evaluation of good government and officials is never done 
by rules in legal documents. Instead, it is done by the “[e]thics in the 
people’s hearts.”106 
B. Individualistic Versus Collective Well-Being 
China’s cultural emphasis on the collective well-being, instead of the 
individual, is another contradiction with American political ideals, and 
future international recognition of the Action Plan must take it into account. 
If religion is to succeed in China, it must be viewed as a unifying strength 
for the common good, not as an individual liberty. 
The collective ideal has long been a driving force behind China’s Marxist 
ideology and current Communist government.107 Unlike the United States, 
their country’s conception of law was never seen as a source of rights and 
entitlements that citizens might invoke for protection from government,108 
especially not for religious believers. Group interests often prevail over 
personal interests.109 Countless Chinese legal decisions that the United 
States finds questionable—from the One Child Policy110 to the mandatory 
retirement age of sixty111—point back to the country’s culture of prioritizing 
greater society over the interests of the individual. Thus, in order for the 
Action Plan to succeed as applied to issues of spiritual faith, “the individual 
rights of the religious believer will always be subordinate to the interests of 
society as a whole.”112 
Let Freedom Ring in Post-Olympics Beijing 1017 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 2 • 2011 
C. Legal Versus Relational Contract Formation 
Third, China’s relational view of contractual formation and enforceability 
adds little hope for strict enforcement of the religious provisions within 
China’s new Action Plan. Again, using American law as a starting point of 
familiarity, most educated contracting parties tend to include a detailed 
recitation of each side’s rights and obligations, both actual and 
contingent.113 These contracts are broad in scope and insurance-like in their 
articulation of consequences for all possible outcomes.114 All expectations 
are defined by the contract; if a matter is not addressed, there is no 
obligation or entitlement.115 
Although written contracts are used in China, Chinese parties do not 
regulate their relationships by self-initiated legal standards. Instead, they 
seek a pattern of continued association, making adjustments as needed in 
order to be responsive to particular considerations that the law, even in its 
most sweeping attempts at flexibility, might ignore.116 A traditional Asian 
contract anticipates, rather than defines, the ensuing relationship; it 
memorializes a relationship’s beginning instead of concluding a business 
deal.117 In fact, “assigning firm consequences to conduct or events long 
before the conduct or events occur (if at all) is counterintuitive” to 
traditional Asian cultural practices, where mutual adjustment and 
accommodation is to be expected.118 
Situational and circumstantial considerations tend to prevail over 
contractual terms, and custom and usage win out over written statements of 
law.119 For example, “from a traditional Asian perspective, a ‘confer in 
good faith’ or ‘friendly negotiation’ clause represents an executory 
contractual promise no less substantive in content than a price, payment, or 
delivery term.”120 In addition, avoiding or disregarding a contract is not a 
matter of moral significance for most Asians. As described above, because 
rule-of-law is generally associated with the arbitrary whims of disdainful 
rulers (instead of the deistic origins that American and Europeans hold it 
to), breaking a contract is more understandable than blameworthy.121 
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In order to promote reform that would be best accepted by the Chinese 
themselves, these three pearls of cultural wisdom within the Chinese legal 
framework—rule-of-man, emphasis on the collective well-being, and 
relational contracting—must be applied to our understanding of China’s 
stance on freedom of religion and human rights overall, as well as its 
experience with international law.  
III.  PREVAILING LAW AND TREATIES REGARDING RELIGIOUS 
RIGHTS 
Given the historical and cultural contexts placed before us, a description 
of China’s current law, beginning with its constitution and including various 
international treaties, also helps to place the Action Plan in greater legal 
perspective. 
A. The PRC Constitution 
China’s primary source of law regarding religious freedom is its own 
constitution.122 Article 36 describes a basic freedom of belief: “No state 
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, 
or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens 
who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.”123 
Although such permissiveness is professed, conditions of discrimination 
still exist. For instance, within the governing Communist Party members 
cannot admit to following any sort of religion.124 Yet, the party doesn’t 
seem to see its own irony—one internal government document stated “the 
fact that our Party proclaims and implements a policy of freedom of 
religious belief does not, of course, mean that the Communist Party 
members can freely believe in religion. . . . There can be no doubt at all that 
they must be . . . atheists.”125 The government is more lenient to party 
members of ethnic minorities, but under the sentiment that party members 
should help them to “gradually shake off the fetters of a religious 
ideology.”126 
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Also, the constitution extends protection only to “normal religious 
activities.” Although not explicitly defined within the document itself, the 
definition of “normal” was discussed and circularly “defined” at a 1988 
Chinese conference on religion and socialism: “The so-called ‘normal 
religious activities’ . . . refer to the religious activities other than the 
religious activities that are abnormal and illegal.”127 Given the Marxist-
Leninist stance on religion as a whole, it is not surprising to hear that the 
conference stated, “It is in itself abnormal to put forward the term ‘normal 
religious activities.’”128 
Given this allocation of “normal” activities, Article 36 also states, “No 
one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public 
order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system 
of the state.”129 Given that China’s number one priority is national unity and 
harmony, together with upholding the importance of a collective society, 
this regulation follows traditional Chinese values of giving precedence to 
public order over individual religious freedom. 
Furthermore, other articles of the constitution permit additional 
derogation from religious rights. Article 51 states that “the exercise of 
citizens . . . of their rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of 
society, and of the collective.”130 Articles 52, 53, and 54 further elaborate 
that the Chinese citizen’s duty is to “safeguard the unity of the country and 
the unity of all its nationalities . . . [observe] public order and respect social 
ethics . . . and to refrain from acts detrimental to the security, honor, and 
interests of the motherland.”131 
Finally, the Four Cardinal Principles included within the 1980 
constitution’s preamble form the “backbone” of the document, while 
speaking negatively towards religious freedom.132 These principles exhort 
officials to “adhere to the socialist road, support the people’s dictatorship, 
follow the leadership of the Communist Party, and take Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Zedong Thought as the guiding ideology.”133 Both the vagueness and 
elasticity of these principles provide further obstacles for religious people, 
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as they are frequently invoked to restrain the expansion of any civil and 
political rights.134 
Most importantly, perhaps, is the provision in the PRC Constitution that 
“religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign 
domination.”135 Once again, China’s suspicion of foreign influence is 
illustrated, this time by statute. As applied through its plain language, no 
non-Chinese missionaries or evangelistic organizations are allowed inside 
the nation. Church members are not allowed contact with overseas church 
groups—including the Vatican—and are forbidden to read Christian 
literature, watch Christian multimedia, or listen to Christian radio 
broadcasts that come from a foreign source.136 
If religion is to thrive under these Four Cardinal Principles, it must be 
under the leadership of Chinese nationals alone, without any contact with 
religious believers from outside nations. At first glance, this may not seem 
problematic to Chinese religious freedom; yet, the Catholic faith is based 
around the Pope’s leadership from Vatican City.137 Restricting Catholics 
from access to their central source of authority makes religious practice 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. Also, the Christian faith, in general, 
believes in worldwide evangelism under Jesus’ call to “go and make 
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the 
Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have 
commanded you.”138 For the Chinese government to order the severance of 
all faith-based international ties is in direct conflict with a Christian’s ability 
to obey their leaders and share their faith with others. 
Beyond the textual difficulties of China’s Constitution, the lack of 
importance placed on rule-of-law has allowed the constant modification, 
revision, addition, and cancellation of various laws at the slightest whim of 
the Communist Party, without any democratic check on its actions. Since 
1949, four constitutions have been promulgated, each serving more the role 
of “mere suggestion” rather than a binding charter.139 Also, the party’s 
monopoly over the judiciary makes it impossible for any independent 
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constitutional interpretation.140 China’s government is under no pressure to 
respect its citizens’ liberties, as no entity can enforce the constitution 
against its high political authority. The most recent constitution, 
promulgated in 1982, gives citizens no right to appeal for alleged violations 
of their rights by the bureaucracy.141 
B. International Human Rights Conventions and Treaties 
In addition to China’s own constitution, the country has signed and 
ratified six of nine core human rights treaties.142 Religious freedom is 
described more specifically within three particular treaty bodies—the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief (DEIDRB). However, the People’s Republic of China 
has not ratified any of these three treaties.143 
The largest problem that Chinese religious believers face when 
attempting to uphold their rights under these few international treaties is 
that these documents, even when ratified, are nonbinding unless China’s 
own domestic laws include the same provisions. Although the United 
Nations’ human rights regime has generally equated ratification with 
incorporation into domestic law, China specifically, given its views on rule-
of-law, may not. For this reason, China’s Action Plan is an important step, 
because it takes legal provisions that the international community had once 
imposed, and incorporates them into Chinese domestic law. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
On September 21, 1948, during the third session of the United Nations’ 
General Assembly, the UDHR was adopted as the first declaration within 
the UN Charter’s “bill of rights.”144 Its principle function was to “promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights” in a way that went 
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beyond the general provisions of human rights in national constitutions and 
other narrow treaties.145 
Specifically regarding religion, Article 18 of the UDHR includes 
“freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”146 This broad 
protection for religious freedom is qualified by Article 29, which, when 
taken into consideration with a legal Chinese interpretation, allows for 
certain limitations to meet “the just requirements of morality, public order, 
and the general welfare in a democratic society.”147 
This Article 29 restriction “potentially licenses a government to prohibit 
any religious system whose moral tenets diverge from majoritarian 
values.”148 If interpreted too broadly, such “‘morality restrictions’ can 
legitimize discrimination against minority views and ultimately undermine 
the stated goals of the Declaration.”149 China has already proven this to be 
true by its treatment of Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, and other 
religious and ethnic minority groups.150 In response, US officials have 
condemned these abuses while supporting positive trends within the country 
and encouraging the Chinese government to address policies that restrict 
Tibetan Buddhist religion.151 However, under Article 29, China is allowed 
to justify its violations of minority religious rights.152 
2.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Another document within the International Bill of Rights, the ICCPR, 
was adopted by the General Assembly on December 16, 1966.153 When the 
General Assembly adopted the UDHR, they requested that the Commission 
on Human Rights (Commission) prepare, as a matter of priority, a covenant 
of human rights and implementation measures. In 1951, the Commission 
drafted fourteen articles on economic, social, and cultural rights;154 yet, 
after a long debate at its sixth session, the General Assembly requested the 
Commission “to draft two Covenants on Human Rights . . . one to contain 
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civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, social and 
cultural rights.”155  
China’s obligations under the ICCPR are less clear, because the state has 
signed but not ratified the convention.156 Under international law, the act of 
signature means that China must refrain from any actions that would run 
counter to the objective and purpose of the treaty until it has “made its final 
intentions known.”157 However, despite its non-ratification, China may be 
legally bound by the treaty if the rights contained within it codify 
international customary law, which all states must uphold as jus cogens. 
The ICCPR’s Article 26 echoes the prohibition of religious 
discrimination found in Article 2 of the UDHR, and both documents’ 
Article 18 mirror each other by granting all individuals the right to have or 
adopt a religion or belief of their choice.158 Article 27 explicitly contains 
additional protections for minority religious believers by asserting that “in 
those States in which religious minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right . . . to profess and practice their own 
religion.”159 Article 27’s lack of restrictions implies that governments have 
less leeway under this provision than the UDHR’s Article 18, which allows 
exceptions for “morality restrictions.”160 
Jerome Cohen, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in 
New York, believes that China’s ratification of the ICCPR would have 
more of a profound effect on the country’s political, legal, and social 
systems than even its accession to the WTO in 2001.161 Yet, hopes of 
Chinese ratification prior to the Beijing Olympics Games have passed and 
fallen.162 In Cohen’s address to the Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Cohen stated that 
the Chinese Communist Party has “decided to meet the specter of social 
instability with harsh repression rather than legislative innovation.”163 
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3.  Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (DEIDRB) 
Following the same presumptions as the UDHR and the ICCPR, the 
DEIDRB was adopted by the General Assembly in 1981. In the DEIDRB’s 
preamble, its drafters stated that “religion or belief, for one who professes 
either, is one of the fundamental elements in his [or her] conception of life” 
and it “should be fully respected and guaranteed” under documents such as 
the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the Action Plan.164 Yet, unlike those 
documents, it authorizes derogation only from the manifestation of religion, 
not from freedom of religious belief.165 
As the most specific of international human rights treaties in its 
enunciation of religious freedom, Article 6 of the DEIDRB allows all 
peoples: 
1. To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, 
and to establish and maintain places for these purposes; 
2. To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian 
institutions; 
3. To make, acquire, and use to an adequate extent the necessary 
articles and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion 
or belief; 
4. To write, issue, and disseminate relevant publications in these 
areas; 
5. To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes; 
6. To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions 
from individuals and institutions; 
7. To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate 
leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any 
religion or belief; 
8. To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies 
in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; and 
9. To establish and maintain communications with individuals and 
communities in matters of religion and belief at the national and 
international levels. 
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Although the DEIDRB is the most all-encompassing treaty of religious 
rights, it is unclear what legal force it possesses and exactly what 
obligations its signatories undertake.166 On one hand, international 
declarations are generally considered nonbinding; however, when the 
General Assembly unanimously adopted the DEIDRB, it included strong 
language requiring all signatories “to enact or rescind” any of their 
legislation that fostered discrimination or restricted religious freedom.167 
China has neither signed this treaty, nor has it been historically enthusiastic 
about incorporating international treaty provisions into its domestic law.168 
Therefore, any effort toward enforcing the Action Plan using the DEIDRB’s 
specific standards would be useless. 
In summary, although the signature and ratification of any international 
treaty is usually seen as a crucial step for implementing these religious 
rights, given China’s distrust of the rule-of-law, legal scholars must 
question if ratification would serve only as a symbolic gesture of goodwill 
and not an actual promise to be held to any standard. Unfortunately, all 
three of these treaties’ vague protections hardly seem enforceable against 
the Chinese government. More creative solutions—solutions that take 
China’s unique history and culture into account—should be crafted to 
effectively supplement the Action Plan. 
IV. THE ACTION PLAN AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE CURRENT 
STATE OF RELIGION IN CHINA 
China’s latest piece of human rights law is its own Action Plan, signed on 
Monday, April 13, 2009, and reaffirming that “China has enshrined respect 
for and protection of human rights in its Constitution as a major principle of 
government, and has taken effective measure to promote the cause.”169 
Using the Action Plan, the government has reinforced President Hu Jintao’s 
comments on religion, taken from his 2007 speech to the 17th CCP National 
People’s Congress (NPC).170 The fifty-four page document is divided into 
five sections—Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Civil and Political 
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Rights; Rights and Interests of Ethnic Minorities, Women, Children, Elderly 
People and the Disabled; Education in Human Rights; and Performing 
International Human Rights Duties, and Conducting Exchanges and 
Cooperation in the Field of International Human Rights—each of which 
appear to be named after sections of the UDHR and other various 
international treaties.”171 
China’s most recent stance on freedom of religious belief is included 
within the Action Plan’s fourth section, titled Guarantee of Civil and 
Political Rights.172 The section states that “China fully implements the 
policy of freedom of religious belief, and in accordance with the law, 
manages religious bodies, venues of religious activities and religious 
believers.”173 The Action Plan does not call for fundamental reforms to the 
nation’s political system—a system which has historically suppressed 
religious thought and practice. Instead, it focuses on advancing respect for 
human rights within existing bureaucracies.174 In five simple bullet points, 
China seeks to implement: 
1. Protection of normal religious activities, “as well as the lawful 
rights and interests of religious bodies, venues of religious 
activities and religious believers themselves” in accordance with 
the law. 
2. Religious laws, including “Regulations on Religious Affairs” as 
well as “improve relevant auxiliary regulations” and “relevant 
local laws and regulations to guarantee freedom of religious belief 
and citizens.” 
3. Protection from compulsion “to believe or not believe in any 
religion, and from any discrimination on the grounds of religious 
belief.” 
4. Respect and protection for ethnic minorities’ religious beliefs and 
cultural heritage. This includes a promise to “make necessary 
investments in the maintenance and reconstruction of temples, 
mosques, and other religious facilities of historical and cultural 
value in ethnic-minority areas.” 
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5. Full play to the positive role of religious circles in the promotion 
of social harmony and socioeconomic development. China also 
“encourages and supports religious circles to launch social 
welfare programs, exploring methods and channels for religious 
groups to better serve society and promote the people’s well-
being.”175 
The Action Plan’s first provision repeats much of the same ideas as 
Article 36 of the PRC Constitution. The vague term “normal religious 
activities” is retained, although identified slightly different as “lawful” and 
“in accordance with the law.” What these actual religious activities entail 
remains undefined and elusive, causing one to wonder whether China’s 
Action Plan is intended more to enforce preexisting limitations on 
organized religion rather than loosen them. 
This ambiguity is also seen in the Action Plan’s second provision, which 
points more specifically to China’s preexisting laws, including regulations 
from its hierarchical RAB organization. As evident from this article’s 
earlier descriptions of these organizations (especially the TSPM, which 
oversees Protestant believers), the enforcement of the RAB’s authority 
through more “Regulations on Religious Affairs,” local laws, and other 
“auxiliary regulations” has only promoted further oppression. 
The third provision, which offers protection from compulsion to believe 
or not believe in any religion, is not a new step forward either, because 
Article 36 of the Constitution addresses compulsion, too. In order for China 
to faithfully uphold this provision, it would require that all political 
leadership positions and party membership be opened up to citizens of all 
faiths without discrimination. Without that allowance, all members of 
government and Chinese nationals in seats of power are automatically 
compelled to profess only one belief—Communism—which is only a form 
of atheism. 
The fourth provision, likewise, repeats past promises from the DEIDRB 
regarding ethnic minorities and protection for their religious beliefs and 
cultural customs. The groups most recognized for experiencing repeated 
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discrimination and suffering are western China’s Xinjiang Uighur Muslims 
and Tibetan Buddhists.176 Yet nothing has changed in the state’s treatment 
of these minority groups since the Action Plan has been released.  
The fifth and final provision seeks to “give full play to the positive role 
of religious circles in the promotion of social harmony and socio-economic 
development.” Besides being the only novel promise included within this 
section of the Action Plan, this fifth regulation is also the most intriguing 
because it offers a unique avenue for religious freedom by way of self-
promotion. Under this regulation, Chinese religious believers are 
encouraged to launch social welfare programs and explore channels for 
religious groups to better serve society. Yet, the Government did not 
indicate whether these statements would apply to unregistered religious 
groups, like the underground church, which is not affiliated with the 
RAB.177 Although possible drawbacks could exist for secret groups such as 
the underground church, whose identity and safety are of urgent concern, 
this alternative seems the most hopeful avenue for obtaining real gains in 
religious freedom under China’s Action Plan. 
Overall, these five provisions, though doubtful in adding novel ideas to 
Chinese law or promoting protection for China’s religious peoples, can be 
viewed either as a success, a façade, or a failure in regards to actual 
enforcement—it all depends on whose eyes one is looking through. 
A. Viewing the Action Plan as a Success for Religious Human Rights 
The comparison given thus far between China’s history, culture, 
international treaty obligations, and its current Action Plan may seem dreary 
and stark, but various scholars recognize that a steady light of hope emits 
from between the Plan’s five religious provisions. Si-si Liu, a Hong Kong-
based researcher for Amnesty International, claims that the document is 
“important because it’s the first-ever action plan for China, and there are 
clear goals in areas such as education and pollution.”178 The Plan’s short 
section on religious freedom may not be as concrete in its goals as a UN 
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declaration, or even incredibly revolutionary, but the Action Plan still 
represents a step in the right direction. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Action Plan (although ambiguously 
phrased) recognizes and repeats promises found in the Chinese 
Constitution, in addition to facially incorporating many international treaty 
protections into China’s domestic law. Including such provisions in Chinese 
domestic law is especially useful where the Chinese assert that the 
international community is using foreign treaties to infringe on China’s 
sovereignty and illegitimately impose the international community’s own 
norms. China’s new self-adopted Action Plan will be easier to enforce than 
international covenants, which the Chinese may or may not have ratified, 
given that such agreements are a form of “cultural imperialism.”179 Those 
international treaties are usually written by non-Chinese drafters, whose 
ideas fall more into the individualistic, rule-of-law legal realm than the 
collective and relational rule-of-man Asian model.180 
Others argue that the most positive achievement that this Action Plan has 
accomplished for religious rights is the mere acknowledgement that China 
has failed to uphold them. The Action Plan marks “a shift from the Chinese 
government’s traditional posture of criticizing human rights as an 
imposition of ‘Western values’ to embracing them as a national goal to be 
realized through concrete assessment targets.”181 Sara Davis, the executive 
director of Asia Catalyst, a support organization for Chinese human rights 
groups, stated that, “Five years ago you couldn’t even say the words 
‘human rights’ in China, so the government should be commended for 
uttering the phrase at last.”182 
Yet, as far as Gao Zhisheng and other imprisoned Chinese nationals are 
concerned, the mere mention of human rights is not the goal. When Gao 
turned his words into advocacy, he was arrested, detained, and tortured, 
drawing attention from people around the world.183 More is needed to 
protect Chinese nationals than mere acknowledgment. 
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Finally, when considering the strengths of the Action Plan, we should not 
forget that its provisions overcome China’s initial cultural hurdles to 
religious reform. China’s acknowledgment of its human rights weaknesses 
and its willingness to become public about seeking improvement are giant 
leaps forward. Given the country’s fixation with “saving face,” this is a 
brave step that should be applauded, and the international community 
should come alongside China with encouragement to continue from its 
starting platform. 
B. Potential Weaknesses of the Action Plan 
Deciding whether to praise China for its progress or criticize its 
government for its continued failings is like asking the age-old question of 
whether the glass is “half-full” or “half-empty.” Most scholars say “both,” 
depending on how they are looking at the glass.184  
Joshua Rosenzweig, a research manager for the Dui Hua Foundation, 
stated that the Action Plan “marks the first time that China will commit to a 
public strategy on human rights that activists can later use as a score card 
for progress.”185 However, “without the will to put an end to such abuses, 
we will see little change . . . Good ideas are not going to be enough. There 
has to be the will to change. That’s always the problem.”186 Human Rights 
Watch claims that although the Action Plan touches on many important 
rights issues, it omits some very notable ones, it lacks benchmarks for a 
meaningful assessment of progress, and its style is “hortatory—asserting 
accomplishments and admitting some difficulties—but opaque.”187 While 
these conventions have made great strides in bringing awareness to human 
rights issues, there are still doubts concerning how well religious freedoms 
are being installed and upheld. 
1. Presenting a Façade that Goes No Deeper 
Given China’s cultural importance of “saving face,” it is a very real 
possibility that the Action Plan is simply a veneer, presented to the 
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international community as a goodwill gesture of promoting change. 
Underneath, it could be grounded by nothing but empty promises. Several 
instances pointing toward China’s need for human rights improvement, as 
well as moments of political embarrassment within the months before the 
Action Plan’s unveiling, suggest a “face-saving” motive as a primary factor 
behind its creation. First, Beijing’s announcement to create an Action Plan 
came three months before China was scheduled to undergo a periodic 
review by the United Nations Human Rights Council.188 Also, the month 
before their announcement, in October 2008, China “lost face” when a 
prestigious European human rights award was given to Hu Jia, a Chinese 
dissident jailed for speaking out on AIDS issues and environmentalism, 
despite Beijing’s warnings that such a prize would damage international 
relations.189 
Speaking from this perspective, Rosenzweig stated, “Some of the most 
serious human rights abuses . . . lie at the doorstep of the Ministry of Public 
Security. I question how committed they are to implementing this plan . . . .  
Otherwise it’s just a symbolic measure.”190 In fact, among the fifty-three 
government ministries, agencies, academics, and NGOs named to the 
Action Plan’s list of “broad participation,” the Ministry of State Security is 
not among the state organs involved.191 
Similarly, Jerome Cohen also told the L.A. Times that, “Most 
international observers who follow human rights in China consider this 
[Action Plan] mostly eyewash. It would be wonderful if the Chinese 
government would open up and discuss concrete cases. Human rights 
watchers want to talk about reality, not principle.”192 
The possibility that China’s Action Plan is merely “eyewash” would set a 
dangerous precedent in international law. If China drafted this Action Plan 
merely to bolster its public image and has no intention of carrying out its 
provisions, not only would the Action Plan be rendered void and 
meaningless, but it could possibly undermine the future of the international 
human rights regime.193 In drafting the Action Plan, China’s leaders may 
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have used rule-of-law rhetoric, but they emphasize that such laws and 
procedures are not to be applied in a “Western manner.”194 Chinese leaders 
want a legal system that “represses the rising tide of social unrest generated 
by China’s rapid success,” for the sake of “saving face,” instead of a law-
based system that fairly processes disputes.195 Cohen argues that the failure 
of “high-touted socialist rule-of-law” to meet the Chinese peoples’ needs, 
together with the “frequent use [of law] as an instrument of repression,” has 
fueled frustrations that are “being transformed into a right resistance.”196 
Considering China’s “saving face” practices on a more personal level, my 
most vivid encounter with the concept comes from a tightly-packed subway 
ride in Beijing. I specifically remember sitting closely to a Chinese woman 
about my age, with foul breath that smelled like the remnants of her fish-
flavored lunch, who asked me from two inches away, “What do you think 
about China?” She proceeded to tell me her honest thoughts about the city’s 
preparations for the Olympic Games, its recent architectural transformation, 
and how Chinese people didn’t like that their hutongs and traditional 
buildings were being destroyed and replaced with skyscrapers. 
“Everybody wants Beijing to look like a modern city for the Olympics,” 
she said, describing how important it was for China to put on a “good face” 
for their international guests. Later, I found a poem that described her 
sentiments with uncanny precision: 
When you come to the Olympic Games in Beijing, you will see 
skyscrapers, spacious streets, modern stadiums and enthusiastic 
people. 
 
You will see the truth, but not the whole truth, just as you only see 
the tip of an iceberg. 
You may not know that the flowers, smiles, harmony and 
prosperity are built on a base of grievances, tears, imprisonment, 
torture and blood.197 
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2. Lack of Enforcement Methodology and Judicial Access 
China’s Action Plan also lacks power to improve religious freedom 
because it contains no means for enforcement. In a Western-style 
democratic system, citizens are familiar with due process laws and an 
independent judicial system that allow anyone, with proper standing, to 
have their day in court, and even appeal. China, however, as a civil-law 
nation with one party and allied courts, employs a much different approach. 
If any Chinese religious believers possessed the courage to bring a case 
under the Action Plan, the chances of the judiciary accepting it are slim. 
At his address to the US Congressional-Executive Commission, Jerome 
Cohen stated, “everyone recognizes that, if China is ever to enjoy a genuine 
rule-of-law, the most fundamental reform required is the development of a 
fair and independent court system.”198 To those who consider this task, it 
seems not just daunting, but impossible given China’s history with rule-of-
law; should it look to Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and China’s other Asian 
neighbors who “have made great strides in this respect” despite that fact 
that they share similar elements of China’s political culture. Further 
research regarding how those Asian countries succeeded in establishing a 
fair and independent judiciary—including where and why China’s previous 
efforts failed—should be given priority by legal scholars as other 
enforcement mechanisms are simultaneously researched. 
3. Lack of Visible Effects on Religious Freedom 
Despite the recent implementation of human rights legislation, the law’s 
effects within China and its real-life application has yet to be seen. John 
Kamm, Director of the Dui Hua Foundation, has stated that some three 
thousand people are still being sentenced every year for political and 
religious offenses.199 Past violations of China’s own human rights promises 
have stemmed from the corruption of political power, China’s refusal to 
recognize rule-of-law, and the judiciary’s inability to enforce protections 
provided under domestic constitutional or statutory legislation.200 Pastors 
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are still imprisoned, churches and religious institutions must still register, 
minority groups are still persecuted for their beliefs, and important foreign 
influences of faith are still outlawed or separated from their Chinese 
followers.201 
Beijing lawyer Li Jinsong, an outspoken advocate for some of China’s 
leading dissidents, doubts that the Action Plan will bring substantial 
progress, because the problem is embedded in China’s underlying political 
systems. “Most problems are connected to corrupt officials, such as the 
Beijing justice bureau.”202 Unless this corruption is removed through social 
restructuring, the implementation of rule-of-law, and other radical shifts in 
China’s current thought paradigms, Chinese religious people will continue 
to suffer persecution, regardless of any Action Plan. Neither Chinese 
domestic law nor international human rights treaties will ever be 
successfully carried out if this corruption continues. People like Gao 
Zhisheng have been imprisoned and tortured because of such injustices, and 
they will remain missing unless change occurs within the societal structures 
that placed them there. 
V. METHODOLOGIES AND ACTORS FOR PROMOTING GREATER 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
I recognize that this article’s expansive spread of Chinese history, Asian 
culture, international treaties, and analysis of the Action Plan’s benefits and 
detriments may cause overwhelming feelings of hopelessness for religious 
reform in China (as well as difficulty for readers to digest such dense, 
complex information all at once). In fact, given China’s unique cultural 
approach, many Americans may step back and argue that China should just 
be left alone to analyze and uphold their own laws. While this viewpoint 
has its merits, those who advocate it tend to forget that the international 
community does play an important role in China’s reform alongside the 
grassroots activism of the Chinese themselves. But first, before Americans 
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and others can come to the table, the hurdle of cultural relativism must be 
overcome. 
Some may argue that the way China treats its religious citizens is its own 
business and that neither the United States nor any other country has the 
authority to intervene.203 Uninvited American judgment would result in a 
poor exportation of our First Amendment freedoms and the importation of 
certain priorities that China has never held for itself.204 Instead, international 
legal scholars should ask themselves, “What worldwide values must be 
upheld at all costs, regardless of country and culture?” The UDHR succeeds 
in naming those values, including jus cogens principles such as the 
prevention of torture, alongside the right to education, freedom of 
association, and religious liberty. Dozens of countries have recognized 
those principles ratified by the UDHR, yet abuses and atrocities continue to 
occur worldwide. 
Focusing on these internationally regarded standards as applicable to all 
cultures, it is right for the international community to proceed in seeking a 
methodology of enforcement regarding China’s Action Plan and a strategy 
for religious rights improvement. If one thinks that Chinese Christians are 
striving only for their own form of Christianity and the Chinese nation 
alone, he or she misunderstands the greater implications of their struggle for 
religious freedom. Chinese Christians are not suffering for their own sake; 
they firmly believe that what they suffer is a universal “sacrifice for human 
dignity and freedom.”205 As Martin Luther King wrote in 1963 in a letter 
from jail, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”206 
A. Diplomacy and More Treaty Making 
The United Stated has played an important role in the global pressure to 
promote religious freedom in China, not only because of the United States’ 
superpower status, but because it is a nation firmly founded on the principle 
of religious freedom and the separation of church and state.207 
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The United States has approached China on all issues of human rights in 
the way it knows best: diplomacy. In October 2000, Congress created the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China with the legislative 
mandate to monitor China’s human rights and the development of the rule-
of-law, as well as to submit an annual report to the President and Congress. 
Also, on June 14, 2005, a Congressional China Caucus was formed to “raise 
awareness on and serve as a forum of discussion for US-China interests in 
the US House of Representatives.”208 Members of Congress continue to use 
this body as a vehicle for educating its members on Chinese issues within 
the context of US interests, assessing trends in China and their effects on 
the United States, and lobbying for change.209 In addition to this main 
congressional body, countless other committees have been formed, and the 
use of both intergovernmental organizations and NGOs alike has been 
encouraged in order to conduct research and improve Sino-US relations, 
alongside the US ambassador.210 
However, improved international relations have not necessarily led to 
improved religious conditions. In September 2009, Jon Huntsman was 
appointed US Ambassador to China, and in Congress’ welcome letter to the 
new ambassador, several pressing issues were reported.211 Leading up to 
China’s sixtieth anniversary in 2009, the government planned a crackdown 
on six Beijing house churches, although many of these churches “posed no 
threat to social order.”212 Members of Congress wrote that “nor should a 
pending national event be cause or justification for violating the 
constitutional right of Chinese citizens to fundamental religious 
freedom.”213 The letter directed Ambassador Jon Huntsman to “affirm the 
US position prioritizing religious freedom, and to publicly state the vital 
importance of religious freedom to a modern nation, the role of religious 
freedom to holistic stability and development, and the imperative for people 
of faith to be allowed to freely worship outside of government 
establishment.”214 
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In order to meet these priorities, common suggestions have been made to 
further the use of UN declarations and treaties or create a new bilateral 
treaty between the United States and China. Yet, no matter how hard the 
United States may try, the Western world is simply not the best actor for 
negotiating human rights standards with China or holding it accountable for 
abuses. This is due in large part to the vast cultural differences between the 
two nations. China rejects American criticism, contending that civil and 
political rights like free speech or an unfettered press do not matter as much 
as those in the social and economic realms, such as the rights to be clothed, 
housed, and fed.215 In fact, turning criticism back around at the United 
States, Beijing publishes its own annual report on American human rights 
violations that highlights crime, racial discrimination, income disparities, 
and a democracy that is “manipulated by the rich.”216 
However, a recent speech to the Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China Human Rights advocated that “China has never been more open to 
international cooperation in all fields than today, and the PRC experts, in 
and out of government, genuinely welcome virtually all opportunities to 
work with counterparts from abroad.”217 Given this open invitation, 
numerous international organizations, foreign governments, NGOs, 
charitable foundations, universities, and lawyers’ groups worldwide have 
helped to launch joint law reform projects in China.218 Nevertheless, “China 
has always gone its own way, and outsiders who have sought to influence 
its course have had much to be modest about.”219 
B. Promoting the Action Plan’s Provision Number Five 
Instead of relying on outsiders, I would argue that the Chinese 
themselves, as “insiders,” are the most effective group for applying pressure 
for change and holding China accountable for its promises for religious 
freedom. Remember that China’s Communist nation was founded not just 
by Mao Zedong alone, but it was a “people’s revolution.” The importance 
of the collective good has forever driven Chinese culture and politics—not 
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only can this principle be utilized to promote reform and freedom, but it 
must be utilized for success to occur.  
Such grassroots mobilization is what drove students to protest at 
Tiananmen Square, to the point of death, for what they believed in. Dorinda 
Elliott of Time magazine, who marched with students in the 1989 mass 
demonstrations for democracy, claims that “what’s missing in China today 
is a sense of idealism . . . there was a spirit of hope of possibility, as young 
and old talked soldiers out of cracking down on the protests.”220 If this same 
idealism could be revived in the religious people of China, the possibilities 
are endless. 
Provision Number Five of the Action Plan opens the door for religious 
believers of all faiths to rekindle the spirit of revolution and prove 
themselves as beneficial citizens for China. These individuals must show 
the possibility that contributing time, finances, service, patriotism, and even 
their personal religious beliefs can and will make their country a better 
place. Examples of this methodology are happening already. For example, 
internal pressure is being increasingly applied from politically oriented 
bloggers and a growing middle class that demand more human rights.221 
Also, after the Sichuan earthquake on May 12, 2008, numerous Chinese 
believers, including its underground network of house churches, initiated a 
“large scale mercy mission of rescue and reconstruction projects.”222 
According to the government statistics, out of about one million rescue 
volunteers, 63 percent were Christians.223 These efforts gave house church 
members the opportunity to become visible through their service and have 
an influence on the transformation of their country. Unfortunately, however, 
the Chinese government launched more serious persecution of the House 
Church Movement that year.224 This situation illustrates how much of a risk 
it is for Chinese believers to step out and promote the cause of religious 
freedom themselves. Many fear the consequences, knowing that one wrong 
move, one slipped comment to the wrong public official, could put them in 
the same place as Gao Zhisheng—or worse. 
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International treaties will have their greatest effect when and where 
China’s national stakeholders—local citizens themselves—have the motive 
and the means to demand treaty compliance and enforcement.225 The Action 
Plan promises greater freedom of religious belief, expression, and 
nondiscrimination—all significant principles that the local Chinese likely 
hold more motivation towards obtaining than outsiders who are not directly 
impacted by the Plan’s provisions. 
C. When? 
The best time frame for the Action Plan’s religious reforms to occur is 
still to be debated. The international community emphasized China’s 
accession to the WTO and China’s grant to host the 2008 Olympic Games 
as turning points for change, yet the new millennium’s first decade closed 
without noticeable improvement. The Olympic Games, a celebratory 
international event, showcased Beijing and inspired China to clean itself up 
both environmentally and politically, although arguably more for the sake 
of “face” than for any actual benefits to Chinese citizenry. 
A disaster like the Sichuan earthquake brought the Chinese people to 
their knees in helplessness and unified the country in service to one another, 
but religious freedom still did not increase. Yet, this very event is a prime 
example of how Provision Number Five can be used to its full potential. 
Just as the Chinese Christian Church, as well as foreign religious groups, 
promoted themselves by supporting national improvement following the 
May 2008 disaster, both groups should keep a lookout for more 
opportunities to prove themselves as valuable, patriotic citizens. 
Although greater effects might be achieved by taking advantage of such a 
terrible disaster, the Chinese people should not wait for a perfect storm (or 
disaster) like the Sichuan earthquake. There may be no better time than 
now, and the means by which change is sought is the most important detail 
to consider. Now more than ever, China has been catapulted into the 
spotlight as a key actor on the world’s stage. In the board room, throughout 
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sports stadiums, and on the front page of international newspapers, China 
has quickly taken second place behind the United States—or even surpassed 
it in some places to become first in global power and influence.226 Now is 
the time for the international community to brush up on their knowledge of 
Chinese history and culture as it forms these global relationships, as well as 
for Chinese believers to become model citizens that their government finds 
to be indispensable to the community. Only then can reform can begin. 
Today, while China is still reveling in the aftermath of the last summer 
Olympic Games and rebuilding from the aftershocks of the Sichuan 
earthquake, is an opportune time for shining up China’s human rights 
record in such a way that goes beyond mere “face.” 
VI. CONCLUSION 
China’s new Human Rights Action Plan is modest in its claims, yet 
presents the international community and Chinese citizens alike with ample 
opportunity to seek long-awaited reform regarding religious freedom. 
As reflected in past events such as China’s 2001 accession to the WTO, 
the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, and the most recent political 
anniversaries of 2009, much emphasis has been placed on convincing China 
to change its policies, yet little has been directed towards understanding 
what China itself considers to be its own priorities. Because of China’s 
cultural inclinations toward a more community-oriented, relational legal 
approach, any attempts at holding the country to a strict rule-of-law when 
interpreting its Action Plan are not feasible. In fact, if the West tried to 
mold Chinese legal thought into accepting such a standard, it would only 
drive China away further. If the transition from relational to legal practice is 
externally inspired and imposed on China, rather than emerging naturally 
from its own traditions, then we must “speak in terms of decades, rather 
than years,” before rule-of-law values become pervasive.227 From an 
American perspective, asking ambassadors and foreign relations 
committees to give up pushing rule-of-law philosophies presents quite a 
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risk, “to the extent that ‘risk’ in the West is perceived as the likelihood of 
divergence from some precise, preordained expectation or standard of 
conduct.”228 But if the United States’ primary goal in improving their cross-
cultural relationship with China is the overall success of the relationship, 
then this risk must be recognized as an essential contribution to the stability 
of future East-West relations. 
More importantly, in order to see the Action Plan’s greatest impact on 
promoting religious freedom, the Chinese people themselves should 
interpret Provision Number Five as an invitation to let their lights shine in 
China as humanitarians and servants to their country. Whether during 
disasters like the Sichuan earthquake, or throughout events like the Olympic 
Games, Chinese religious people can promote their own well-being and the 
reputation of their religion by giving it a role in society through service, 
financial support, and charitable work.  
I realize that this is a risk, especially when so many religious believers 
have been persecuted, imprisoned, tortured, and even killed. But being 
“undercover agents for good” is truly the most efficient way to effect 
change. Chinese religious believers know their country’s history and culture 
best, which gives them the most experience working within the boundaries 
of rule-of-man, “saving face” for their neighbors, promoting the collective 
well-being, and negotiating on a relational level. These are skills unlike 
those any American citizen, nor any Western politician, has to offer. 
 
 
WEB LINK: To hear more about the United States’ political stance on China’s current human 
rights situation, please refer to Recent Hearings and Roundtables of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, specifically those hearings entitled Political Prisoners in 
China: Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy and Human Rights and the Rule of Law in 
China. These hearings occurred on August 3, 2010, and October 7, 2010, respectively, in 
Room 628 of Dirksen Senate Office Building. However, they are available online at: 
http://www.cecc .gov/pages/hearings/2010/20100803/hearingwebcast20100803.php AND 
http://www.cecc.gov/ pages/hearings/2009/20091007/hearingwebcast100709.php. Further 
updates and webcasts of Commission hearings can be found on the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China’s website: 
http://www.cecc.gov/index.php?PHPSESSID=b262448fdb3ff9d0eeeb2abe249c5dc5. 
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